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NOTES
Corporation Law-Meiselman v. Meiselman: "Reasonable
Expectations" Determine Minority Shareholders' Rights
In a close corporation,' a freeze-out occurs when majority shareholders
bar minority shareholders from sharing in the income or participating in the
management of the corporation z With little reason to continue as sharehold-
ers in this situation, the minority may seek to withdraw their investments.
North Carolina General Statutes section 55-125(a)(4) authorizes courts to dis-
solve a corporation when reasonably necessary to protect the "rights or inter-
ests of the complaining shareholder. ' 3 In addition, section 125.1 authorizes the
courts to grant other relief as alternatives to dissolution.4 Although the legisla-
ture authorized the dissolution remedy in 1955, the North Carolina Supreme
Court only recently has fully considered it for the first time.
In Meiselman v. Meiselman5 the supreme court held that the "reasonable
expectations" of minority shareholders determine their rights or interests.6
These reasonable expectations may arise when the minority becomes a share-
holder, and may develop thereafter.7 Although the court attempted to ensure
the liberal relief afforded by section 55-125(a)(4),8 the court's reasonable ex-
pectations test falls short of relieving all minority shareholders who suffer
from a "freeze-out." 9 Consequently, the test should be expanded to more fully
encompass minority shareholders.' 0
In 1971 Ira Meiselman acquired approximately seventy percent of the
stock in several interrelated family corporations, and his brother Michael ac-
1. A close corporation is typically owned and managed by a small number of shareholders.
The shares of the close corporation generally are not traded on the securities market. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 308 (5th ed. 1979). See also infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982). Other provisions of § 55-125 provide for invol-
untary dissolution of a corporation in an action by a shareholder upon deadlock or pursuant to an
existing shareholders' agreement. The statute also provides for dissolution in an action by credi-
tors or the attorney general. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (1982).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. 55-125.1 (1982). "Such relief may be granted as an alternative to a
decree of dissolution, or ... whenever the circumstances ... are such that relief, but not dissolu-
tion, would be appropriate." Id § 55-125.1(b). Relief may include, but is not limited to: (1)
modifying the corporate charter or bylaws; (2) modifying corporate resolutions or acts; (3) di-
recting or prohibiting any act of the corporation, shareholders, directors or officers; and (4) "pro-
viding for the purchase of their fair value of shares of any shareholder, either by the corporation
or by other shareholders." d § 55-125.1(a).
5. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
6. Id. at 298, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
7. Id.
8. Id at 294, 307 S.E.2d at 560.
9. See infra notes 148-79 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
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quired the remaining thirty percent."I The brothers worked for the family
corporations,12 but their business relationship was not harmonious,13 At trial,
Michael contended that Ira had excluded Michael from participating in the
corporations and had restricted his access to corporate offices and information.
He further claimed that Ira had acquired and sold corporate assets without his
consent, and had discouraged him from board participation.' 4 Ira contended
that Michael's limited participation had been voluntary.' 5
In 1973 Ira formed Republic Management Corporation (Republic), as-
suming sole ownership.' 6 Republic and Eastern Federal Corporation (Eastern
Federal, the parent corporation of the family businesses) then entered into a
contract requiring Republic to perform management services for Eastern Fed-
eral in exchange for five and one-half percent of Eastern Federal's sales.' 7 In
August 1979 Michael brought a suit challenging the propriety of this contract,
based, in part, on Ira's sole ownership of Republic.' 8 In response to the suit,
Ira fired Michael from the family corporations.' 9 In addition to losing his
salary, Michael lost his car, hospital, and life insurance, his use of corporate
credit cards, and his participation in a profit-sharing trust.20
In response, Michael filed suit against Ira and the family corporations
seeking involuntary dissolution 2' of the corporations under section 55-
125(a)(4),22 or alternatively a buyout of his share of the corporations by de-
fendants under section 55-125.1.23 Michael pursued his claim on the grounds
11. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 282, 307 S.E.2d at 553. Michael and Ira acquired ownership of
the corporations from their parents through a series of gifts and bequests ending in 1971. Id
12. Id at 282, 307 S.E.2d at 554.
13. Id at 284-87, 307 S.E.2d at 555-56. Perhaps most indicative of the tenor of the relation-
ship between the two brothers is Ira's comment that "[yles, it is my position in this case that my
brother, Michael, suffers . . . from crippling mental disorders and that was a reason that my
father put me in control of the family corporations." Id at 286-87, 307 S.E.2d at 556.
14. Id at 285-86, 307 S.E.2d at 555.
15. Id at 284, 307 S.E.2d at 555. Furthermore, Ira contended that Michael never had been
denied participation in the management of the family corporations. Id
16. Id at 283-84, 307 S.E.2d at 554-55.
17. Id at 284, 307 S.E.2d at 554.
18. Id at 283, 307 S.E.2d at 554. The opinion does not describe the nature of this suit, but
Michael apparently alleged that Ira had usurped a corporate opportunity. Michael also alleged
this claim in his suit under analysis here. See infra note 23.
19. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 283, 307 S.E.2d at 554. Ira also terminated the contract between
Eastern Federal and Republic. He characterized Michael's release as incidental to the termination
of the contract. Id.
20. Id
21. A corporation may be dissolved voluntarily when shareholders agree to terminate the
corporate existence. When such agreement is lacking, state intervention is required to dissolve the
corporation involuntarily. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-117 (1982) (voluntary dissolution by
written consent of the shareholders) and id § 55-118 (voluntary dissolution by action of directors
and shareholders) with id § 55-122 (involuntary dissolution in action by attorney general) and id
§ 55-125 (power of courts to liquidate and decree involuntary dissolution).
22. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
23. The purchase of the complaining shareholder's shares by the corporation or other share-
holders enables him to liquidate his investment in the corporation. See supra note 4. The book
value of the family corporations was $11,168,778 on December 31, 1978. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at
282, 307 S.E.2d at 553.
Michael also sought to recover the profits accumulated by Republic under the contract be-
tween Eastern Federal and Republic. He pursued this derivative claim on the ground that Ira had
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that an irreconcilable conflict, causing intense hostility and bitterness, existed
between Michael and Ira; and that Ira had exercised his control of the corpo-
ration to exclude Michael from participation in the corporations and to fire
Michael.24
The trial court denied relief, but the court of appeals reversed.25 The
court of appeals interpreted section 55-125(a)(4) as authorizing liquidation
when the complaining shareholder establishes that "basic 'fairness' compels
dissolution. ' 26 The court also determined that relief under section 55-125
"does not require a complaining shareholder to show bad faith, mismanage-
ment or wrongful conduct, but only real harm."27 The court concluded that
"the evidence shows that Michael's immense book value wealth is being ren-
dered worthless to him as current income, and that, despite Michael's stock in
the corporate enterprises, he is denied the benefits of that ownership." 28 This
denial entitled Michael to relief under section 55-125.1,29 and, accordingly, the
court remanded for determination of an appropriate remedy other than
dissoultion. 30
In an opinion written by Justice Frye, the North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals' decision, but on different grounds. The court
rejected the "basic fairness" and "real harm" tests of the court of appeals,
holding that the "rights or interests of the complaining shareholder" under
section 55-125(a)(4) are to be determined from complaining shareholder's "
'reasonable expectations' . . . in the corporation. ' 31  The court then an-
nounced the following test:
[U]nder N.C.G.S. § 55-125(a)(4) a trial court is (1) to define the
"rights or interests" the complaining shareholder has in the corpora-
breached his fiduciary duty to the family corporations. That is, he usurped the corporations' op-
portunity to participate in the profits generated under the contract by his sole ownership of Re-
public. Id at 306, 307 S.E.2d at 567. "ITIhe 'corporate opportunity doctrine provides that a
corporate fiduciary may not appropriate to himself an opportunity that rightfully belongs to his
corporation.'" Id at 307, 307 S.E.2d at 568 (citing Note, Corporate Opportunity and Corporate
Competition: A Double-Barreled Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1193, 1202-04
(1982) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 271-73, 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (1939)).
24. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 58 N.C. App. 758, 761-62, 295 S.E.2d 249, 252 (1982), modiYed,
309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
25. Id at 776, 295 S.E.2d at 260.
26. Id at 766, 295 S.E.2d at 254-55. The court noted that other jurisdictions usually granted
relief to minority shareholders either to relieve oppression of minority shareholders by the major-
ity or to achieve fairness. Id at 763, 295 S.E.2d at 253. The court interpreted the language of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982) as precluding an oppression-based analysis. See also infra
notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussion of oppression-based analysis). Accordingly, the
court adopted a fairness test. This test appears to have been adopted from Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf
& Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1975). Meiselman, 58 N.C. App. at 763 n.8,
295 S.E.2d at 253 n.8. See also infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (discussion of Stump]).
27. Meiselman, 58 N.C. App. at 766, 295 S.E.2d at 255.
28. Id at 769, 295 S.E.2d at 256. Michael's annual return from dividends was less than 2% of
his investment in the corporations. Id at 769 n.ll, 295 S.E.2d at 256 n.ll. See also Meiselman,
309 N.C. 302 n.5, 307 S.E.2d at 565 n.5.
29. At trial Michael dropped his claim for involuntary dissolution and sought only a buyout
of his interest in the corporations. Id at 761 n.5, 295 S.E.2d at 252 n.5.
30. Id at 776, 295 S.E.2d at 260.
31. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 298, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
1984] 1001
NORTH CAROLINA L4 REVIEW[
tion; and (2) to determine whether some form of relief is "reasonably
necessary" for the protection of those "rights or interests." For plain-
tiff to obtain relief under the expectations analysis, he must prove
that (1) he had one or more substantial reasonable expectations
known or assumed by the other participants [and concurred in by
them 32]; (2) the expectation has been frustrated; (3) the frustration
was without fault of plaintiff and was in large part beyond his con-
trol; and (4) under all the circumstances of the case plaintiff is enti-
fled to some form of equitable relief."33
The court also determined that section 55-125(a)(4), regarding dissolu-
tion, and section 55-125.1, regarding alternatives to dissolution, must be read
together. Consequently, the court established that "when an action is brought
under N.C.G.S. § 55-125(a)(4), the trial court is to examine. . . whether...
liquidation is reasonably necessary," whether "'alternative' relief [under sec-
tion 55-125.1(b)] is more appropriate than dissolution," or whether "'alterna-
tive' relief, but not dissolution is appropriate. '34 In light of the newly
formulated analysis of sections 55-125(a)(4) and 55-125.1, the supreme court
remanded the case for an application of the reasonable expectations test.35
32. In summarizing the expectations-based analysis, the court apparently neglected to in-
clude this qualification established earlier in the opinion: "The key is "reasonable.' In order for
plaintif's expectations to be reasonable, they must be known to or assumed by the other share-
holders and concurred in by them." Id. This omission is noted because the qualification would
appear to enhance the evidentiary burden on the complaining shareholder.
33. Id at 301, 307 S.E.2d at 564.
34. Id at 300-01, 307 S.E.2d at 564. Although "liquidation" and "dissolution" are not identi-
cal terms of art, the opinion treats them as synonyms for the termination of a corporation's exist-
ence. Id at 301 n.4, 307 S.E.2d at 564 n.4.
Justice Martin filed a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Branch and Justice Cope-
land. Id at 314,318, 307 S.E.2d at 571, 573 (Martin, J., concurring). Justice Martin urged that the
majority test failed to consider "the actions of all the participants." Id The fault or conduct of
the minority shareholder should be considered, as well as whether he has "pursued all the other
available statutory means for the protection of his rights." Id at 315, 307 S.E. 2d at 572. Con-
versely, Justice Martin would also have the court consider whether the majority shareholders' acts
constituted "oppression." Id at 316, 307 S.E.2d at 573. See also infra notes 180-82 and accompa-
nying text.
Justice Martin's reference to other statutory means of protection is apparently a reference to
such statutes as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-25 (1982) (minority shareholders' rights to attempt to gain
representation on the board of directors) and id § 55-5 0 (minority shareholders' rights to compel
dividends).
Query whether Justice Martin's concern regarding minority shareholder conduct might be
covered by the majority test. See supra note 33 and accompanying text at subpart (3). Concerning
majority shareholder conduct, the majority opinion implicitly rejected an oppression-based analy-
sis, Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 297-99, 307 S.E.2d at 560 and 562-63, and explicitly rejected a focus on
the majority's actions. Id at 305-06, 307 S.E.2d at 566-67.
35. Meselman, 309 N.C. at 314, 307 S.E.2d at 571. The supreme court also remanded for
reconsideration of Michael's claim that Ira had usurped a corporate opportunity with the manage-
ment contract between Republic and Eastern Federal. See supra note 23. The court affirmed the
court of appeals' reversal of the trial court, which had found no usurption. The case was re-
manded, however, for an application of the newly announced usurption of corporate opportunity
analysis.
The court of appeals recognized that "directors, officers, and majority shareholders owe a
fiduciary duty and obligation of good faith to minority shareholders as well as to the corporation."
Meiselman, 58 N.C. App. at 774, 295 S.E 2d at 259. When such persons receive an advantage to
the exclusion of some shareholders, the fiduciary duty is breached. Id In light of these standards
the court concluded that: "Ira, as a controlling shareholder and director of Eastern, cannot, over
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As the supreme court noted, the family corporations in Meiselman were
close corporations.3 6 While defining "close corporation" is no simple task,
many commmentators limit their use of the term to corporations whose shares
are not generally traded on the securities market.37 Another aspect of close
corporations is the typically small number of shareholders. 38 These share-
holders generally manage the corporation as well.39 The intimacy of the close
corporations gives rise to a highly personal business relationship among the
manager-owners. 4° Accordingly, their relationship has been characterized as
similar to partners.4 1 This relationship contrasts with the publicly held corpo-
ration, in which ownership is disseminated among numerous shareholders,
and directors and officers, who may not be shareholders, manage the
corporation.
The problems that arise in close corporations often differ substantially
from those of publicly held corporations. For example, two individuals who
wish to start a business may regard themselves essentially as partners, presum-
ing that they will share in the management of the business.42 They may incor-
Michael's objection, enter into a contract that generates a profit for a corporation which he owns
alone." Id.
The supreme court announced the following test:
[When an officer or director is charged with having usurped a corporate opportunity, he
or she must establish under N.C.G.S. § 55-30(b)(3) [and Highland Cotton Mills v. Ragan
Knitting Co., 194 N.C. 80, 138 S.E.428 (1927)] that the "corporate transaction" in which
he or she has engaged is "just and reasonable" to the corporation because it was not an
opportunity or "corporate transaction" which the corporation itself would have wanted.
A determination of what is "just and reasonable" and, thus, whether a corporate oppor-
tunity has indeed been usurped, is, of course, one which "no hard and fast rule can be
formulated."
Meiselman, 309 N.C. 310, 307 S.E.2d at 569 (citation omitted). The court elaborated by requiring
an examination by the trial court of "whether the disputed opportunity is functionally related to
the corporation's business [and] whether the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the op-
portunity." Id at 311, 307 S.E.2d at 570.
36. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 288, 307 S.E.2d at 557.
37. See, e.g., Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York- Liberalizing the Rights of Minority
Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 24, n.2 (1981); Hillman, The Dissatisfied Paricipant in the
Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close
Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1, 64 n.213 (1982).
This definition is implicitly accepted in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b)
(1982). The statute was drafted to authorize the use of shareholder agreements in the close corpo-
ration text. Such agreements shall not be invalid "[e]xcept in cases where the shares of a corpora-
tion are at the time or subsequently become generally traded in the markets maintained by
securities dealers or brokers." Id
38. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution,
19 U. CHI. L. Rav. 778 (1952). See also Davidian, supra note 37, at 24 n.2.
39. Israels, supra note 38, at 788.
40. Hillman, supra note 37, at 62.
41. See, e.g., Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("In an intimate busi-
ness venture such as this, stockholders of a close corporation occupy a position similar to that of
joint adventurers and partners."). See also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592-
93, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975); 68th St. Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 549,
362 A.2d 78, 85 (1976), af'd, 150 N.J. Super. 47, 374 A.2d 1222 (1977).
42. The presumption of partnership-like decisionmaking is deemed commonplace by many
commentators. See, e.g., Davidian, supra note 37, at 26; Israels, supra note 38, at 778-79; O'Neal,
Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW 873, 884, 885
(1978). General partnership law typically provides that "[a]ll partners have equal rights in the
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porate to acquire the limited liability, 4 3 preferred tax treatment, 44 and
perpetual existence45 that accompany the corporate form. Because of a dispar-
ity between the individuals' contributions of capital or time to the corporation,
one may become a majority shareholder, the other a minority shareholder.
Later a disagreement over corporate policy may arise between the individuals.
If the individuals cannot reconcile their differences, the disagreement will be
resolved in favor of the majority shareholder. His ownership of a majority of
the voting shares and his control of the board of directors enable him to con-
trol corporate decisionmaking. 46 The minority shareholder will find that the
personal relationship and presumptions of mutual decisionmaking give way to
the majority rule doctrine.4 7 In contrast, the publicly held corporation, char-
acterized by dicotomous ownership and management, is controlled by an in-
dependent board.4 8 Rarely could a shareholder control corporate policy or
exclude other shareholders from the decisionmaking process. Should the mi-
nority shareholder in the close corporation become dissatisfied with his posi-
tion, he may wish to end the business relationship by selling his shares.
Unlike the shareholders of a publicly held corporation whose shares are regu-
larly traded, however, the minority shareholder generally will find his shares
unmarketable. 49
The vulnerability of the minority shareholder in the close corporation is
management and conduct of the partnership business." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e), 6
U.L.A. 213-14 (1969).
43. Tort and contractual liability arising out of corporate operations is limited to the corpo-
rate entity. That is, shareholders are not liable. H. HENN, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRIZES § 146, at 344-49 (3d ed. 1983). In a partnership, such liability extends
beyond the business entity to the partners. Id § 24, at 73-75.
44. Corporate income is taxed according to corporate rates, which are more favorable than
comparable individual rates. Id § 76, at 133. Partnership income is taxed as if received by the
partners at individual rates. Id § 27, at 81.
45. A partnership is generally deemed dissolved when, among other things, a partner dies or
withdraws. Id § 26, at 77. In contrast, the corporate entity is assumed to exist in perpetuity. Id
§ 75, at 132.
46. General corporation law prescribes a representative form of government or corporate
democracy. Holders of a majority of voting shares may elect and control a majority of the board
of directors. Subsequently, corporate policy is determined by a majority vote of the board or in
some instances a majority vote of the shareholders. See F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINOR-
ITy SHAREHOLDERS § 3.02 (1975); Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Busi-
ness Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, 433 (1956).
47. "In the absence of some special control arrangement, set up by contract or special charter
or bylaw provision, a corporation is subject to the principle of majority rule: holders of a majority
of the voting shares govern." F. O'NEAL, supra note 46, § 3.03.
Indeed, one commentator has noted that the "structure of representative government 'pre-
scribed by general corporation law' is about as appropriate for the two-man get-together in a close
corporation as Robert's Rules of Order." Latty, The Close Corporation, in NORTH CAROLINA
CORPORATION MANUAL 190, 191 (1960).
48. In a close corporation "the independent judgment of directors is, in fact, a fiction." Is-
raels, supra note 38, at 778.
49. Potential buyers are not anxious to step into the shoes of the minority shareholder. See
F. O'NEAL,supra note 46, § 1.03; Davidian,supra note 37, at 27; Comment, Deadlock andDissolu-
tion in the Close Corporation: Has the Sacred Cow Been Butchered? 58 NEB. L. REv. 791, 796
(1979).
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particularly illustrated by the freeze-out.5 0 Freeze-outs have been described as
"various techniques by which persons in control of an enterprise deprive mi-
nority owners of their interest in the business or of a fair return on their invest-
ment."51 Most often the majority will effect a freeze-out by restricting the
payment of corporate dividends.52 If the minority is employed by the corpora-
tion, the majority ordinarily will fire him.5 3 Ultimately the majority will "try
to deprive him of every economic benefit he derives from the corporation."5 4
Faced with no return on his investment, no bargaining power, and little hope
of reconciliation with the majority, the minority shareholder likely will hope
to withdraw from the corporation with his investment.5 5 Because his shares
are unmarketable, the minority may consider judicially imposed dissolution or
buyout as his only available recourse.5 6
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to dissolve corporations at the
request of the minority shareholders.5 7 At about the turn of the century,
50. The terms "freeze-out" and "squeeze-out" are synonyms. F. O'NEAL, supra note 46,
§ 1.02 n.2. "Freeze-out" has been adopted in this note.
51. Id § 3.02. The underlying causes for freeze-outs may include greed, desire for power,
personality clashes, and disagreements over corporate policy. Id § 2.02. The majority share-
holder, however, may have a proper motive. "Minority shareholders may be so uncooperative
and act so unreasonably and improperly that majority interests are justified in moving to eliminate
them." Id. § 1.02.
In Meiselman Michael alleged the classic freeze-out case. Compare infra notes 51-56 and
accompanying text (freeze-out techniques) with supra notes 13-14, 19-20 and accompanying text
(Michael's situation).
52. F. O'NEAL, supra note 46, § 3.04.
53. Id See also Davidian, supra note 37, at 27.
54. F. O'NEAL, supra note 46, § 3.06. "[The minority] may even find himself without life,
accident, hospitalization or health insurance. ... Id "Sometimes majority shareholders drain
off corporate profits by having other enterprises they own perform services for the corporation
under management or service contracts. ... Id § 3.13.
Like the exercise of majority control in corporate decisionmaking, see supra note 47 and
accompanying text, the freeze-out disappoints the presumption commonly held by the minority
that he will receive employment and pecuniary benefit from the corporation. See O'Neal, supra
note 42, at 884.
55. The alternative is in effect to abandon his investment. See Hetherington, Special Charac-
teristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 29.
56. Typically, state law affords the minority shareholder some statutory protection from the
freeze-out. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-25 (1982) (minority shareholders' right to attempt to
gain representation on the board of directors); id § 55-50 (minority shareholders' right to compel
dividends); id § 55-67 (right to cumulative voting); id § 55-38 (right to examine corporate books
and records). These rights, however, may be frustrated if the majority forces the minority to
litigate each time he attempts to exercise them. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 46, § 1.03. Dissolution
or buyout allows the minority to liquidate his investment and end his business relationship.
The minority shareholder may prefer a buyout to dissolution because the liquidation value of
the corporation typically is small when compared with the going concern value of the corporation.
Ordinarily the judicially imposed buyout is formulated on the basis of the fair market value of the
minority shares. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1(a)(4) (1982).
One should distinguish the dissatisfied minority shareholder in Meiselman from the 50% own-
er who may seek relief because of "deadlock" of the corporation. Deadlock generally occurs when
control of the corporation is split evenly, and the inability to reach a majority decision prevents
the corporation from operating effectively. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(l)-(2) (1982).
See also Comment, supra note 49, at 794-95.
57. The general common-law rule was that absent statutory authority, a court of equity had
no power to dissolve a solvent corporation in response to a minority shareholder's suit. See, e.g.,
Steenrod v. L.M. Gross Co., 334 Ill. 362, 166 N.E. 82 (1929); Strong v. McCogg, 55 Wis. 624, 13
N.W. 895 (1882). See also J. Tingle, The Stockholder's Remedy of Corporate Dissolution 25-32
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courts began to recognize various equitable grounds for dissolution,5 8 but the
circumstances under which relief was granted were unpredictable.59 As the
unique problems of close corporations became more widely recognized in the
1950s, several states, including North Carolina,60 passed statutes authorizing
dissolution as a remedy for minority shareholders.61 Today, virtually every
state recognizes such statutory relief.62
Despite statutory authorization of dissolution, courts still consider the
remedy to be drastic. 63 Reluctance to dissolve continues because the value of
(1959). The traditional reluctance to dissolve can be attributed in part to the majority rule doc-
trine and the business judgment rule. The majority rule doctrine provides that the holders of a
majority of voting shares govern the corporation. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
"The business judgment rule recognizes a broad discretion in the directors to determine business
policy and to conduct corporate affairs." F. O'NEAL, supra note 46, § 3.03. Courts are hesitant to
substitute their judgment for elected managers who presumably have expertise in business mat-
ters. The application of these principles have produced a hands-off approach to judicial review of
internal corporate affairs. Id
Participants in the close corporation often think of themselves as partners. F. O'NEAL, supra
note 46, § 2.10. See also supra note 42 and accompanying text. Particularly in the area of dissolu-
tion, many commentators have suggested that close corporations should be treated like partner-
ships. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 46, § 7.15; Davidian, supra note 37, at 66-67; Comment, supra
note 49, at 825. Cf. Hillman, supra note 37, at 61-68. Partnership law generally allows free disso-
lution between the participants. See, e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31, 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969).
58. See, e.g., Ross v. American Banana Co., 150 Ala. 268, 43 So. 817 (1907) (complete failure
of corporate purpose). See generally Graham v. McAdoo, 135 Ky. 677, 123 S.W. 260 (1909) (cor-
porate ruin inevitable due to mismanagement); Miner v. Belie Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W.
218 (1892) (failure of corporate purpose due to fraudulent mismanagement and misappropriation
of funds); Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 75 N.W. 46 (1898) (gross mismanagement and
misappropriation of corporate property); Comment, supra note 49, at 798-805 (development of
equitable grounds for dissolution).
59. See Davidian, supra note 37, at 43; Comment, supra note 49, at 805.
60. North Carolina was recognized as a pioneer in close corporation legislation. I F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.14a (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as I F.
O'NEAL]. The North Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1955 contained several statutes
drafted with the close corporation in mind, including N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (1982) (involun-
tary dissolution). See Latty, supra note 47, at 191; see also id at 193-204 (specific statutes intended
to meet the special requirements of close corporations).
The North Carolina legislature rejected the idea of a special close corporation act separate
from the general corporation act. See Latty, supra note 47, at 191. Such close corporation legisla-
tion is commonly referred to as an integrated close corporation act. Delaware, Maryland, Penn-
sylvania, and Kansas have enacted integrated acts. O'Neal, supra note 42, at 875. The draftsman
of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1955 believed that one act adequately covers
all corporate activity. Consequently, the close corporation statutes are scattered throughout the
general corporation act. See Latty, supra note 47, at 191. For a discussion of the pros and cons of
integrated versus unintegrated statutes, see Karj ala, A Second Look at Special Close Corporation
Legislation, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1207 (1980).
61. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (Smith-Hurd 1959); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW
§ 9 (1948). See generally 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, at § 1.14a (pioneer close corporation legisla-
tion). It has been suggested that such legislation came primarily at the urging of various commen-
tators rather than from litigation in the area of close corporation dissolution. See Hetherington,
supra note 55, at 1-3.
62. See, 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.28 (2d ed. 1971) [herein-
after cited as 2 F. O'NEAL]; Comment, supra note 49, at 807; see also infra note 69.
63. See, e.g., Stumpf v. C. E. Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 235, 120 Cal. Rptr.
671, 674 (1975) ("The minority must persuade the court that fairness requires drastic relief [of
dissolution]."); Hockenberger v. Curry, 191 Neb. 404, 406, 215 N.W.2d 627, 628 (1974) ("The
remedy of liquidation is so drastic that it must be invoked with extreme caution.") (quoting Poli-
koffv. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962)).
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a business as a going concern typically exceeds its liquidation value.64 Conse-
quently, several states have authorized alternatives to dissolution.65 Alterna-
tives may include broad discretionary powers of the court to cancel, alter, or
enjoin acts of the corporation, shareholders, directors, or officers.66  Fre-
quently, they also include a provision authorizing a judicially supervised
buyout of the minority shares by the corporation or other shareholders. 6
7
Such alternatives provide relief to the minority while preserving the
corporation.
Generally, the grounds for alternative relief parallel those established in
the state's involuntary dissolution statute.68 Various statutory grounds for dis-
solution have been recognized, but most states follow the position of the
Model Business Corporation Act. 69 These states focus on "illegal, oppressive
64. See, e.g., Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 438-49 (W. Va. 1980). See also Folk,
Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: the Robinson Treatise Reviewed and the Statute
Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REV. 768, 785 (1965); Hillman, supra note 37, at 47 ("Because of the
possibility that some significant portion of going concern value or goodwill may not be realized if
the assets are liquidated, courts frequently view corporate dissolution as a 'drastic,' 'harsh,' or 'last
resort' remedy."); Comment, supra note 49, at 797.
65. See supra notes 62-64; infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-216 (1977); CALIF. CORP. CODE § 1803 (West
1977); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450-1825 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1982); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-21-155 (Supp. 1982). The North Carolina statute was adopted from the South Carolina
statute, which was modeled on § 210 of the English Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c 38.
R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 29-12 n.3 (3d ed. 1983).
See also Proposed Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corp. Act,
§ 16, Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, American Bar Association, printed in 36 Bus. LAW. 269 (1981) (recommended dissolution
alternatives).
67. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-216 (1977); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1977);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT., Ch. 32, § 1214 (Supp.
1978); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 4-603 (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1825
(1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West
Supp. 1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118 (Consol. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1975);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-155 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (1982).
68. Alternative relief statutes typically provide for remedies other than dissolution when the
minority has filed for relief under the state's dissolution statute. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 1118 (Consol. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1982). See also R. ROBINSON, supra note 66,
at § 29-14 (As a formal matter the minority shareholder must bring an action under the dissolu-
tion statute but asking for relief under the alternative relief statute.).
69. "The ... courts shall have a full power to liquidate the assets and business of a corpora-
tion:
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is established:
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive
or fraudulent .. " MODEL BUSINESS Cop. ACT § 97(a)(2) (1980).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-195(a)(1)(b) (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540(2) (1968); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 64-908(a)(2) (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-8-113(2)(a) (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE
§ 30-1-97(a)(2) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 496A.94(l)(c) (West Supp. 1981); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-413(b)(2)
(1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 21.450.1825(l) (1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-193(a)(2)
(1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485(1)(b) (Vernon 1966); MONT. CoIE ANN. § 35-1-921(1)(a)(ii)
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2096(l)(b) (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(C) (West Supp.
1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-16(A)(1)(b) (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(a)(1) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-21-16(1)(b) (1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 210(A)(2) (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 7-1.1-90(a)(2) (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-
150(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 47-7-34(2) (1967); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16010-92(a)(2) (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2067(a)(1)(B) (1973); WASH. REV. CODE
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or fraudulent" 70 actions of the majority shareholders. Courts typically have
interpreted such "majority oppression" statutes as requiring wrongful conduct
on the part of the majority.7'
North Carolina's involuntary dissolution statute differs from the majority
oppression statutes because it provides for dissolution when "reasonably nec-
essary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining share-
holders."72 This language shifts the court's focus from the actions of the
majority to the impact on the minority. That is, majority oppression statutes
consider oppression by the majority; the North Carolina statute considers the
rights and interests of the minority. Because the "rights or interests" language
appears in only a few other jurisdictions,73 it has received little judicial inter-
pretation, and the effect of this shift of focus is thus unsettled. The few cases
involving such statutes, however, suggest that they may afford the minority
shareholder broader relief.
For example, in Stumpf v. C E. Stumpf & Sons, Inc. 74 the California
Court of Appeals held that a minority shareholder was entitled to dissolution
after he had suffered a freeze-out. 75 Initially, the court noted that the actions
of the majority did not support relief under the majority oppression provision
of California's dissolution statute.76 Then the court announced that dissolu-
ANN. § 23A.28.170(l)(b) (1969); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-41(a)(2) (1982); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-
614(a)(i)(B) (1977).
70. See supra note 69.
71. See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 628, 507 P.2d 387, 393
(1973) (oppression is "burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct. . ."). Hillman, supra note 37,
at 45 ("Baker represents a traditional approach under which severe misconduct is required for a
finding of oppression.").
See also Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980) (conspirator-
ial action on the part of two defendant shareholders against a third shareholder deemed oppres-
sive); Fix v. Fix Material Co., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. App. 1976) (combination of long-term
management controls to controlling shareholders, heavy corporate losses, and salary increases to
the majority not deemed oppressive, but coming narrowly close, and continuation of such conduct
might lead to dissolution in a subsequent suit); Baylor v. Beverly Book Co., Inc., 216 Va. 22, 216
S.E.2d 18 (1975) (waste of corporate funds to the benefit of the majority deemed oppressive);
White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972) (exclusion of other shareholders from corpo-
rate participation, and personal use of corporate property by the majority, deemed oppressive);
Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Groundfor Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DUKE L.J. 128, 131
(courts have held that majority actions such as plundering the corporation, siphoning off profits
through excessive salaries to themselves as officers, and running the corporation for the sole bene-
fit of the majority constitute oppression or misconduct justifying dissolution).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982).
73. See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-
a(b)(2) (Consol. Supp. 1983). The California and New York dissolution statutes also contain
"majority oppression" provisions. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 1104-a(a)(1) (Consol. Supp. 1983).
74. 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1975).
75. In Stump/ a father and two sons owned the corporation in equal shares. As a result of a
management dispute and hostility between the brothers, one brother ceased to be employed by the
corporation. It is not clear from the opinion whether he resigned or was fired. Thereafter, the
father and remaining brother, as majority shareholders, removed the minority brother as an officer
of the corporation. In addition, the minority brother received no salary, dividends, or other reve-
nue from the corporation. Id at 232, 235, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 672, 675. Compare supra notes 50-55
and accompanying text (freeze-out techniques).
76. The court's remarks were directed at the predecessor to § 1800(b)(4) of the California
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tion under the "minority interests" provision 7 7 would be granted "when re-
quired to assure fairness to minority shareholders."7 8 The origin of this
fairness test is unclear.79 Indeed, the court failed to provide any standards in
determining fairness. It inferred, however, that the minority interests provi-
sion supports minority relief beyond that afforded by the standards of oppres-
sion or wrongful conduct by the majority.80
The New York courts have also interpreted a dissolution provision
grounded on the rights or interests of minority shareholders. In Zn re Topper8 '
the supreme court granted relief 82 to a minority shareholder suffering from a
freeze-out. 83 Focusing primarily on the interpretation of New York's majority
oppression provision, 84 the court found that the actions of the majority "se-
verely damaged [the minority shareholder's] reasonable expectations85 and
constitute[d] a freeze-out of [his] interest; consequently, they [were] deemed
Corporations Code, which is substantially the same as the current version. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 465 1(e) (,Vest 1977) (repealed 1977).
(b) The grounds for involuntary dissolution are that: (4) Those in control of the corpora-
tion have been guilty of or have knowingly contenanced persistent and pervasive fraud,
mismanagement or abuse of authority or persistent unfairness toward any shareholders
or its property is being misapplied or wasted by its directors or officers.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West 1977).
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the majority had not committed
any "abuse of authority" or displayed "persistent unfairness" toward the minority. Stumpf, 47
Cal. App. at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
77. The action was brought under the predecessor to § 1800(b)(5) of the California Corpora-
tions Code, CAL. CORP. CODE § 4651(f) (West 1977) (repealed 1977), which is substantially the
same as the current version, CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West 1977). The current version
states: "(b) The grounds for involuntary dissolution are that: (5). . . liquidation is reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder or sharehold-
ers." Id
78. Stumpf, 47 Cal. App. at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
79. The court does not indicate the source of the test. The adoption of a fairness test for the
minority interests provision is curious. "Persistent unfairness" by the majority toward the minor-
ity is an alternative ground for dissolution under the majority oppression provision. Indeed, the
court of appeals found that the majority had not displayed "persistent unfairness." See supra note
76 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying note 80. Professor Hillman has sug-
gested that the court's superficial treatment of the fairness test indicates the court was not aware of
the uniqueness of the minority interests provision with which it was dealing. See Hillman, supra
note 37, at 58 n.192.
80. Stumpf, 47 Cal App. 3d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
81. 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1980).
82. While the court did not order dissolution, the alternative relief of a buyout was granted.
The court directed the majority to purchase the shares of the minority at a fair market value
determined by the court. Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 28-29, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
83. In Topper plaintiff owned a minority interest in two close corporations. Less than a year
after the formation of the corporations, the majority fired the minority shareholder, terminated his
salary, removed him as an officer, and changed the locks on the corporate offices. Id at 27, 433
N.Y.S.2d at 362.
84. "(a) [A shareholder] may present a petition of dissolution on one or more of the following
grounds:
(1) The directors or those in control of the corporation have been guilty of illegal, fraudulent
or oppressive action toward the complaining shareholders." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1 104-a(a)(1)
(Consol. Supp. 1983).
85. Because the minority shareholder had terminated his previous employment, invested his
life savings in the corporations, and executed personal guaranties on behalf of the corporations,
the court found that the minority shareholder had a reasonable expectation that he would be an
active participant in the corporations. Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 27, 433 N.Y.S. 2d at 361-62. Partic-
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'oppressive' within the statutory provision."86 The New York involuntary dis-
solution statute also provides for a consideration of the rights or interests of
the minority.s 7 Accordingly, the court extended the reasonable expectations
test to that provision: "These rights and interests derive from the expectations
of the parties and special circumstances that underlie the formation of close
corporations. 88
In Topper the court fully embraced the reasonable expectations test that
has been urged persistently by F. Hodge O'Neal,89 a recognized authority in
the close corporation field. Generally stated, the test provides that "a court
should give relief, dissolution or some other remedy to a minority shareholder
whenever corporate managers or controlling shareholders act in a way that
disappoints the minority shareholder's reasonable expectations." 90 The basis
of the test lies in the special characteristics of the close corporation. Because
of substantial investment in the corporation or personal relationships among
the participants, O'Neal suggests that the participants have certain reasonable
expectations at the inception of the enterprise. 91 These expectations typically
include participation in management and employment by the corporation. 92
While the expectations often are not reduced to writing,93 the participants typ-
ically have oral agreements or "half-articulated understandings. '94 In the ab-
sence of a written agreement, courts typically allow the majority shareholder
to dominate corporate decisionmaking. 95 Consequently, the minority share-
holder is vulnerable to a freeze-out. 96 O'Neal concludes that it is unjust to
allow a freeze-out when the participants actually have had an understanding
ipation was deemed to include participation in management and operations, and remuneration for
employment with the corporation. 1d at 33, 433 N.Y.S. at 365.
86. Id at 28, 433 N.Y.S. at 362 (emphasis added).
87. "(b) The court, in determining whether to proceed with involuntary dissolution. . . shall
take into account:
(2) Whether liquidation of the corporation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the
rights and interests of any substantial number of shareholders or of the petitioners." N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 1104-a(b)(2) (Consol. Supp. 1983).
88. Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 35, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
89. Id. at 32-34, 433 N.Y.S. at 364-65. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 46, § 7.15; 1 F. O'NEAL,
supra note 60, § 1.14c; O'Neal, supra note 42, at 881-88.
A reasonable expectations test also has been supported by other commentators. See, e.g.,
Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Modelfor Reform, 55 VA.
L. REv. 1043, 1063 (1969); Hillman, supra note 37, at 75-76.
Topper's and Professor O'Neal's reasonable expectations tests have been followed in
O'Connell v. Marine Repair Servs., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (interpreting New
York law); and In re Taines, Ill Misc. 2d 559, 444 N.Y. S.2d 540 (1981).
90. O'Neal, supra note 42, at 886.
91. Id at 884-85.
92. Id
93. "[M]ost state corporation statutes validate special charter and bylaw provisions and
shareholder's agreements designed to protect minority shareholders." Id at 881. The minority
may lack the foresight, however, "or his bargaining position may be so weak that he is unable to
negotiate for protection. Further, he may have been given or may have inherited his minority
interest." Id at 883.
94. Id at 886.
95. Id at 884.
96. Id at 883.
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of shareholder participation.97 Thus, these understandings and accompanying
expectations should be protected; the doctrine of majority rule should not be
strictly applied in close corporations.9" O'Neal suggests that reasonable ex-
pectations should be protected to the extent that "they exist at the inception of
the enterprise, and as they develop thereafter through a course of dealing con-
curred in by all of [the shareholders]." 99
O'Neal notes that a reasonable expectations test might be used to provide
relief in jurisdictions that have "majority oppression" statutes, '0 but he urges
application of the test in all jurisdictions.10 1 Whether a reasonable expecta-
tions test is used to define minority relief under a majority oppression stat-
ute' 02 or minority interests statute, 03 the relief afforded by such a test appears
to go beyond the traditional notions of minority shareholder protection.1' 4
The test abandons a focus on the oppressive acts of the majority and considers
the impact upon the minority, ' 0 5 supporting relief even when the majority had
not acted wrongfully. 10 6
The foregoing statutory provisions and judicial interpretations illustrate
the variety of approaches taken in determining the extent of minority share-
holder relief. Majority oppression statutes represent the majority approach.
Such statutes traditionally have been interpreted as requiring wrongful con-
duct by the majority. Alternatively, other jurisdictions have found it more
appropriate to focus on the minority. That is, how has the minority been af-
fected by the acts of the majority? The most notable exception to the oppres-
sion as wrongful conduct approach are statutory provisions that protect the
rights or interests of minority shareholders.
California has interpreted its minority interests provision as sanctioning
relief when required to ensure fairness to minority shareholders. New York
has interpreted such a provision as protecting the reasonable expectations of
minority shareholders. In addition, the reasonable expectations test has been
applied under majority oppression statutes, thus modifying the traditional in-
97. Id at 887.
98. Id at 886.
99. Id See also Afterman, supra note 89, at 1064 (a court should examine the whole history
of the shareholder's relationship as expectations alter and new expectations develop over the
course of the shareholders' cooperative efforts in operating the corporation).
100. O'Neal, supra note 42, at 886.
101. Id
102. The reasonable expectations test has been applied outside New York to afford minority
relief under majority oppression statutes. See, e.g., Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., - Mont. ._ 645
P.2d 929 (1982); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554
(1979),afl'd, 174 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W.
Va. 1980).
103. Before Meiselman, New York was apparently the only jurisdiction to apply the reason-
able expectations test to a minority interest statute.
104. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
105. See Hillman, supra note 37, at 49. This shift in focus parallels a similar shift in the
minority interest statutes. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
106. Id See also O'Neal, supra note 42, at 886 (minority reasonable expectations should be
protected "even though the acts of the [majority] fall within the literal scope of [their] powers or
rights").
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terpretation of such statutes. These tests-minority interests, fairness, or rea-
sonable expectations-support relief when the acts of the majority have not
risen to the level of wrongful conduct, but nevertheless harm minority share-
holders. Consequently, dissolution or alternative remedies are more readily
available under these statutes. The test for minority relief adopted in a juris-
diction, therefore, essentially determines the difficulty of attaining relief. The
selection of a test implicitly balances minority interests against the interest of
the majority and the corporation in avoiding the hazards that might accom-
pany minority relief.10 7
In has been suggested that relief to minority shareholders carries the po-
tential for minority abuse. For example, the minority might bring or threaten
to bring a dissolution suit even when the majority has acted innocently.'08
The minority might seek an enhanced position in the corporation, a change of
corporate policy, or a buyout of his interest. 0 9 Or the minority might inten-
tionally create discord to achieve dissolution, not because of an injurious ma-
jority but because the minority simply wants to withdraw his investment. 10
As dissolution and alternative remedies become more easily attainable, the
bargaining leverage of the minority is increased."' Consequently, the inno-
cent majority may accede to the demands of the minority for fear of dissolu-
tion, or simply to avoid litigation. "12
Absent minority shareholder abuse, minority relief also threatens to dam-
age corporate viability. As minority relief becomes more easily obtainable the
majority "may be forced to make their business judgments more with an eye
toward avoiding [litigation] than toward serving the best needs of the corpora-
tion."" 3 It has also been suggested that the enhanced availability of the reme-
dies of dissolution and buyout may diminish the financial resources available
to close corporations. Lenders might be deterred from extending credit; a
buyout may diminish corporate funds available for repayment, or dissolution
may produce liquidation values insufficient to cover corporate debts. 14 Inves-
tors might be deterred from contributing capital; they may be called upon to
contribute to a buyout and may be unable to recoup their investment from
liquidation values.15
The North Carolina statutes provide for minority relief "when reasonably
necessary to protect the rights or interests" of the minority shareholders. The
relief afforded by this minority interests provision had never been fully ad-
dressed before Meiselman. While a few cases have considered the provision,
107. See Davidian, supra note 37, at 48; Hillman, supra note 37, at 87-88. See also Palikoff v.
Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 IlL. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962).
108. See Davidian, supra note 37, at 60.
109. See Hillman, supra note 37, at 73.
110. See Davidian, supra note 37, at 45-46.
111. See Hillman, supra note 37, at 72-73.
112. See Davidian, supra note 37, at 60.
113. Note, Corporate Dissolutionfor Illegal, Oppressive or Fraudulent acts: The Maryland Solu.
lion, 28 MD. L. Rev. 360, 372 (1968).
114. See Hillman, supra note 37, at 75.
115. Id
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none have provided significant interpretation. 16 Prior to Meiselman, the most
significant judicial development in North Carolina close corporation law was
Blount v. Taft. 1 7 In Blount the supreme court did not interpret the minority
interests provision; however, the court did consider the minority shareholder's
position in the close corporation.
In Blount the supreme court denied specific enforcement of a close corpo-
ration shareholders' agreement.' 18 A minority shareholder argued that the
agreement could not be terminated without unanimous shareholder ap-
proval. 19 The court held that the agreement had been legitimately terminated
by a majority vote of the directors.120 In reaching its decision, the court recog-
nized that the problems of a close corporation "are different from those of a
publicly held corporation."' 2'1 In particular, "majority rule" enables the ma-
jority shareholder to dominate corporate policy to the exclusion of the minor-
ity.' 22 To enable minority shareholders to protect themselves, noted the court,
the legislature adopted North Carolina General Statutes section 55-73123 to
sanction shareholders' agreements. 124 By means of a shareholders' agreement,
shareholders can adopt decisionmaking procedures that avoid the conse-
quences of majority rule.' 25 Because such agreements deviate from the norms
of majority rule, the court deemed it reasonable "to require the degree of
deviation intended be explicitly set out.' 26 The court concluded: "[M]inority
116. See Dowd v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 263 N.C. 101, 139 S.El2d 10 (1964); Royall
v. Carr Lumber Co., 248 N.C. 735, 105 S.E.2d 65 (1958); W & H Gaphics, Inc. v. Hambry, 48 N.C.
App. 82, 268 S.E.2d 567 (1980).
117. 295 N.C. 472, 246 S.E.2d 763 (1978).
118. Id at 484-85, 246 S.E.2d at 771. In Blount the shareholders unanimously approved a
corporate bylaw provision that limited nepotism within the corporation. The bylaws also con-
tained a provision authorizing repeal of the bylaws by a majority vote of the directors. Subse-
quently, a majority did repeal the antinepotism provision. While the antinepotism provision was
deemed a valid shareholders' agreement, the court found the repeal valid. Id
119. Blount, 295 N.C. at 480, 246 S.E.2d at 769.
120. .d at 485, 246 S.E.2d at 771.
121. Id at 482, 246 S.E.2d at 770.
122. In [close corporations], if the internal "government" of the corporations were con-
ducted strictly by the vote of the majority of the outstanding shares, the largest share-
holder(s) could dominate the policies of the corporations over the objections of other
shareholders. "In a nutshell, Family A with 51% ownership of a close corporation can
live in luxury off a profitable business while Family B starves with 49%."
Id (citations omitted).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1981). Section 55-73(b) reads in part:
Except in cases where the shares of a corporation are at the time or subsequently become
generally traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers or brokers, no written
agreement to which all shareholders have actually assented, whether embodied in the
charter or bylaws or in any side agreement in writing and signed by all the parties
thereto, and which relates to any phase of the affairs of the corporation, whether to the
management of its business or division of its profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as
between the parties thereto, on the ground that it is an attempt by the parties thereto to
treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange their relationships in a
manner that would be appropriate only between partners.
124. Blount, 295 N.C. at 483, 246 S.E.2d at 770. "With respect to close corporations, the heart
of the North Carolina [Business Corporation] Act is G.S. 55-73." Id (citing Latty, Close Corpora-
tions and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, 438-40 (1956)).
125. Blount, 295 N.C. at 481, 246 S.E.2d at 769.
126. Id at 487, 246 S.E.2d at 773.
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shareholders who would have protection greater than that afforded by Chapter
55 of the General Statutes and the judicial doctrines prohibiting breach of a
fiduciary relationship must secure it themselves in the form of 'a well drawn'
shareholders' agreement."' 127 The Blount decision unquestionably provides a
strong incentive for minority shareholders to protect themselves with written
shareholders' agreements. Blount, however, does not appear to preclude mi-
nority relief in the absence of such an agreement. Indeed, the court's remarks
suggest that minority relief might be afforded by other provisions of chapter
55128 or judicial sponsorship. 129 In Meiselman the supreme court was faced
with determining the full extent of minority shareholder protection in North
Carolina.
Specifically, Meiselman considered the relief or protection afforded under
section 55-125(a)(4),130 which authorizes dissolution to protect the rights and
interests of minority shareholders, and section 55-125.1,'31 which authorizes
alternative remedies. In considering the appropriate extent of minority relief
in the close corporation, the court's analysis substantially paralleled the views
of F. Hodge O'Neal. 132 The court recognized that ideally a minority share-
holder has provided for his own protection through a written shareholders'
agreement executed at the inception of the corporation, 33 but noted that fre-
quently such an agreement is not negotiated because of the minority's lack of
foresight or bargaining power.134 Despite the absence of an agreement, the
minority has reasonable expectations that may include participation in corpo-
rate management and employment. 135 The majority shareholder is in a posi-
tion to disappoint those reasonable expectations; "because of his greater voting
power, [he] is in a position to terminate the minority shareholder's employ-
ment and exclude him from participation."' 36 The absence of a market for
shares of a close corporation only exacerbates the minority shareholder's
problem. 137
Having examined the minority's vulnerability to a freeze-out,' 38 the court
recognized the need to protect the "minority shareholder whose 'reasonable
expectations' have been disappointed."' 139 Accordingly, the court held that a
127. Id at 488, 246 S.E.2d at 773.
128. The North Carolina Business Corporation Act.
129. See Blount, 295 N.C. at 487, 246 S.E.2d at 773 (principle of equity or public policy); id
(judicial doctrine prohibiting breach of fiduciary relationship).
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982).
131. Id. § 55-125.1 (1982).
132. Compare infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text; supra notes 89-99 and accompanying
text.
133. Me/selman, 309 N.C. at 290, 307 S.E.2d at 558. While the court did not consider Blount,
Meiselman implicitly rejects any interpretation of B/ount that suggests minority shareholders will
be protected only to the extent of a written shareholders' agreement. See supra note 127-29 and
accompanying text.
134. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 291, 307 S.E.2d at 558.
135. Id at 289-90, 307 S.E.2d at 558.
136. Id at 290, 307 S.E.2d at 558.
137. Id at 291, 307 S.E.2d at 559.
138. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
139. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 293, 307 S.E.2d at 559.
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"complaining shareholder's 'rights or interests' in a close corporation include
the 'reasonable expectations' the complaining shareholder has in the
corporation." 140
The reasonable expectations test appears consistent with the language of
section 55-125(a)(4). As noted, under majority oppression statutes, courts tra-
ditionally have focused on the wrongful acts of the majority.' 4 1 In contrast,
the minority interests language of statutes similar to section 55-125(a)(4) has
been interpreted as shifting the focus to the impact on the minority.t 42 The
reasonable expectations test has received a similar interpretation. 43 Assum-
ing that the Meiselman court intended an interpretation of section 55-125(a)(4)
that fulfilled the intent of the legislature, the reasonable expectations test ap-
pears to be a good choice. 44
The reasonable expectations test also appears consistent with the court's
desire to protect the frozen-out minority.' 4 5 The shift in focus of the test, from
majority to minority, abandons the traditional position that minority relief re-
quires a showing of majority wrongdoing.' 46 Indeed, the court explicitly re-
jected wrongful majority action as a standard for relief.147 Whereas a freeze-
out might not come within the standard of wrongdoing, the reasonable expec-
tations test holds the promise of relief to the minority who faces a freeze-out in
spite of his expectations to the contrary.
The reasonable expectations test thus provides more broadly based relief
to the minority than the majority wrongdoing standard. The court, however,
established four prerequisites for relief under the test.148 These requirements
140. I d at 298, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
141. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
144. The Meiselman court might have noted that the original draft of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
125 (1982) also included the provision that dissolution might be granted if "[t]he acts of directors
or those in control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent, or their acts are other-
wise unfair to the minority shareholders or to any class of shareholders." Sapp, Dissolution, Liqui-
dation and Minority Shareholders Rights, in NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION MANUAL 240, 244
(1960). Such a majority oppression statute traditionally has been interpreted as requiring wrong-
ful conduct by the majority. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. The reasonable ex-
pectations test focuses instead on the minority and rejects the majority oppression approach. See
supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. Because the legislature rejected the majority oppres-
sion provision, the reasonable expectations test appears consistent with legislative intent.
145. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
147, The Meiselman court rejected the trial court's focus on possible wrongdoing by Ira. The
trial court was instructed, on remand, to focus instead on Michael's rights or interests. Meiselman,
309 N.C. at 305-06, 307 S.E.2d at 566-67. Additionally, the court rejected "[t]he trial court's use of
the standards of 'oppression,' 'overreaching,' 'gross abuse,' 'unfair advantage,' and the like with
respect to Ira's actions." Id at 306, 307 S.E.2d at 567.
148. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The court's four part test is similar to that
formulated by Professor Hillman.
To be entitled to relief under an expectations-based analysis, the dissatisfied shareholder
should show: (1) that he or she became a participant because of a substantial expectation
or set of expectations known or assumed by the other participants; (2) that the prospect
that the expectation will be achieved is unlikely; and (3) that the failure to achieve the
expectation was in large part beyond the control of the participant.
Hillman, supra note 37, at 77.
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potentially preclude relief to some minority shareholders who actually have
suffered a freeze-out.
The first prerequisite requires the minority shareholder to establish the
existence of his reasonable expectations.14 9
These "reasonable expectations" are to be ascertained by examining
the entire history of the participants' relationship. That history will
include the "reasonable expectations" created at the inception of the
participants' relationship; those "reasonable expectations" as altered
over time; and the "reasonable expectations" which develop as the
participants engage in a course of dealing in conducting the affairs of
the corporation. The interests or views of the other participants must
be considered in determining "reasonable expectations." The key is
"reasonable." In order for plaintiffs expectations to be reasonable,
they must be known to or assumed by the other shareholders and
concurred in by them. Privately held expectations which are not
made known to the other participants are not "reasonable." Only
expectations embodied in the understandings, express or implied,
among the participants should be recognized by the court.'5 0
From this language, it appears that the minority must establish something akin
to a shareholders' agreement, 15 ' not written, but nevertheless an "understand-
ing, express or implied." This requirement might be achieved easily by some
minority shareholders; 15 2 for others it may prove to be a significant obstacle.
In particular, the requirement may affect minority shareholders who did not
attain an understanding, who reached an understanding but cannot prove its
existence, or who reached a written agreement that does not include the full
understandings of the shareholders.153
In Meiselman the court noted that minority shareholders often lack the
bargaining power or foresight to negotiate a formal agreement at the inception
of the relationship.' 54 It is difficult to imagine how the minority's position is
enhanced after entering into the corporation. The reasonable expectations test
was intended to deal with the problem of the minority who failed to provide
for his own protection with a formal agreement.' 55 Yet, some minority share-
holders may be unable to meet the standards of the test. A minority may have
149. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
150. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 298, 307 S.E.2d at 563. These guidelines substantially represent
the views of Professors O'Neal and Hillman. See O'Neal, Supra note 42, at 886; Hillman, supra
note 37, at 77, 85-86. See also supra note 148.
151. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 27, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361. ("The petitions and supporting
affidavits in this case show conclusively, and respondents do not deny, that petitioner. . . associ-
ated himself with [the corporations) in the expectation of being an active participant in the opera-
tion of both corporations.").
153. The requirement may also affect the minority shareholder who cannot prove that his
expectations are substantial. Under the court's guidelines for establishing reasonable expecta-
tions, "only substantial expectations should be considered." Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 299, 307
S.E.2d at 563. It would appear, however, that employment and management participation are
expectations that meet this standard.
154. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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or develop expectations of participation, yet, given its disadvantaged position,
be unable to attain an understanding "concurred in" by the other sharehold-
ers-either expressly or by implication.' 56
The shareholders actually may have reached an understanding regarding
the participation of the minority that he may not be able to prove. If an ex-
press understanding had been reached, the majority may deny its existence.
Absent an express agreement, the court suggested that implied understandings
may be established by a "course of dealing" or the "history of the participants'
relationship."'1 7 Such evidentiary sources do not aid the minority if the his-
tory of the relationship has been hostile. A hostile relationship does not sup-
port the conclusion that the shareholders have "concurred in" an
understanding, a prerequisite to minority relief. For example, in Meiselman
the brothers apparently never had maintained "'cooperative efforts in operat-
ing the business.' "158 Consequently, it is arguable that Ira never "concurred
in" the participation of Michael in the family corporations.
The problem of proving an existing understanding appears particularly
acute for the passive investor. Such an investor ordinarily commits capital to
the corporation with an understanding that he will enjoy a return on his in-
vestment, yet refrain from management participation. 1-59 Initially, the corpo-
ration may be unable to generate enough profits to pay dividends. Once the
corporation has earned sufficient profits, the majority may withhold dividends
as a freeze-out technique. Assuming the majority denies the existence of an
express agreement, the history of the relationship would not support the impli-
cation that the passive investor reasonably expected a return.
The shareholders may enter into a written agreement that does not em-
body all their expectations or understandings.16 0 For example, the agreement
may not include assurances of participation in management and employment.
Subsequently, the minority shareholder who is suffering a freeze-out may
claim a frustration of his expectations, alleging that the shareholders infor-
mally agreed to his participation and employment. While the reasonable ex-
pectations test was intended to deal with this problem,161 the test does not
guarantee relief. In light of the existence of a written agreement that covers
other aspects of substantive corporate policy, a court might conclude that the
expectations were never a subject of understanding among the
shareholders.' 62
156. "Determining the existence of mutual acceptance of expectations becomes more difficult
as the number of participants increases. What may be a manageable task when only two or three
participants are involved may be exceedingly difficult as the number increases." Hillman, supra
note 37, at 85.
157. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
158. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 299, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
159. See Hillman, supra note 37, at 79 n.248.
160. See, e.g., Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 27, 33, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361, 365.
161. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
162. See Hillman, supra note 37, at 84; see also id at 78 n.246, (parol evidence rule may
exclude evidence not contained in an existing written agreement).
The Melselman reasonable expectations test, however, does not compel this result. Quoting
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These examples illustrate cases in which minority shareholders may never
meet the court's initial requirement that the minority shareholder establish his
reasonable expectations. For practitioners who represent close corporation in-
terests, the message of Blount and Meiselman appears to be to assume the
worst in the close corporation relationship. That is, embody the expectations
in a written shareholders' agreement. Thereafter, document any understand-
ings reached. 163
Assuming the minority shareholder has established his expectations, he
must show that they have been frustrated. 64 If the minority has been ex-
cluded systematically from the corporation over a substantial period of time,
this requirement might be met easily. If the freeze-out has existed for a short
period of time, however, a minority shareholder might be denied relief unless
he can show that his expectations are unlikely to be achieved in the future. 65
In addition, a minority shareholder who has not suffered total exclusion might
be granted more limited relief on the grounds that his expectations have been
substantially fulfilled.
To satisfy the third part of the test, the minority shareholder must also
show that the frustration of his expectations was not his fault and was beyond
his control.166 The court did not elaborate on this requirement, 167 but a recent
New Jersey case illustrates how this requirement might deny relief. In Ex-
adakilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc. 168 the court applied a test similar to
a reasonable expectations test 69 and determined that the minority shareholder
had expected to participate in the management of the corporation.170 Dissolu-
tion was not granted, however, because of his unsatisfactory managerial per-
O'Neal, the court recognized that: "'In a close corporation, the corporation's charter and bylaws
almost never reflect the full business bargain of the participants.'" Meselman, 309 N.C. at 299,
307 S.E.2d at 563 (quoting O'Neal, supra note 42, at 886). O'Neal continued, in the original text:
"Even when the participants formalize their bargain in a written shareholders' agreement, their
participation in the business is often grounded on assumptions that are not mentioned in the
agreement." Id
163. See Valenti, Business Associations, 33 SYRACuSE L. RE. 11, 14 (1982).
164. See mpra note 33 and accompanying text.
165. See Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 220, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138
(1960). See also Hilman, supra note 37, at 79.
166. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
167. In his concurring opinion, Justice Martin stated that: "If it is determined that plaintiffs'
rights or interests require protection because of plaintiffs' own conduct, it would appear improper
to grant equitable relief." Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 315, 307 S.E.2d at 572 (Martin, J., concurring).
168. 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), a7'd, 174 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980).
InExadaktilos the minority shareholder received his ownership in the corporation by a gift of
stock from his father-in-law. Subsequently, he was employed by the corporation. He was later
fired because he failed to "learn the business." The minority brought an action for dissolution
under New Jersey's majority oppression statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(l)(c) (1983). Cf.
Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 29, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362 ("[w]hether the controlling shareholder dis-
charged petitioner for cause or in their good business judgment is irrelevant .... "). See also
Hillman, supra note 37, at 54 ("Exadaktilos represents a significant limitation on the reasonable
expectations analysis, and as such it is not likely to produce results different from those of the
traditional approach to oppression.").
169. While the court did not explicitly recognize a reasonable expectations test, the court did
apply an expectations-based analysis. See Exadaktilos, 167 N.J. Super. at 154-55, 400 A.2d at 561.
170. Id at 155-56; 400 A.2d at 561-62.
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formance.17 ' The court deemed satisfactory performance a "condition
precedent" to the fulfillment of his management expectations.' 72 It appears
then that a frozen-out minority might be denied relief if his actions have con-
tributed to his predicament.
Finally, the minority shareholder must show that under all the circum-
stances of the case he is entitled to some form of equitable relief.173 While the
court considered that focusing on the acts of the majority would be inappro-
priate,' 74 consideration of all the circumstances places importance on the ef-
fect of minority relief on the majority shareholders. Such circumstances
appear to include the "benefit and injury"' 75 to the other shareholders and the
"rights or interests" 176 of other shareholders. The court failed to define such
circumstances further. Whether circumstances regarding the effect on the ma-
jority might be used to deny relief to minority shareholders is unclear; how-
ever, these circumstances might mitigate relief. For example, dissolution might
not be granted to the minority on the basis that the loss of the going concern
value 177 is "unduly burdensome"'178 on the other shareholders. Alternatively,
the court might force the majority to buy out the minority interest. Valuation
of the buyout might be diminished or the terms of payment extended to relieve
any perceived burden on the majority. 179
Nevertheless, this final requirement of the reasonable expectations test
does benefit minority shareholders. Under all the circumstances, the minority
needs only to show that some form of relief is necessary.' 80 That is, he does
not have to show dissolution is warranted before alternative relief is avail-
able. 18 1 Absent the requirement that the minority must establish the necessity
of "drastic"'182 dissolution relief, his chances of attaining some relief may be
enhanced.
171. Id at 155, 400 A.2d at 561.
172. Exadaktilos, at 156, 400 A.2d at 562.
173. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
175. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 296-97, 307 S.E.2d at 562 ("The statutes [N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-
125(a)(4); 55-125.1 (1982)] require a standard in which all of the circumstances surrounding the
parties are considered ... . [T]he trial court, in deciding whether to grant relief, 'must exercise
its equitable discretion, and consider actual benefit and injury to [all of] the shareholders resulting
from dissolution' or other possible relief.") (citation omitted).
176. See id (" 'The question is essentially one for resolution through the familiar balancing
process and flexible remedial resources of courts of equity.' To hold otherwise would allow a
plaintiff to demand at will dissolution of a corporation or a forced buyout of his shares or other
relief at the expense of the corporation and without regard to the rights or interests of other share-
holders.") (citation omitted).
177. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
178. Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 316, 307 S.E.2d at 573 (Martin, J., concurring)).
179. Id
180. Id at 301, 307 S.E.2d at 564.
181. Id Because N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1982) (alternatives to dissolution) provides for
alternative remedies in an action filed under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (1982) (dissolution), § 55-
125.1 might be interpreted to require a showing that dissolution was warranted before alternative
relief was available. The court rejected this construction. See also R. ROBINSON, supra note 66,
§ 29-14 (interpreting the availability of alternative relief consistently with the court).
182. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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This analysis of the court's four-part reasonable expectations test reveals
a standard of minority relief that goes beyond that traditionally afforded by
majority oppression statutes, or any position that suggests minority interests
must be protected with a written agreement. Consequently, minority share-
holders may be protected to an extent not available in some other jurisdic-
tions.' 83 The analysis also indicates, however, that relief to minority
shareholders may be denied or mitigated by problems of proof, the minority
shareholder's conduct, or other circumstances. Some minority shareholders
may never establish successfully their reasonable expectations under the stan-
dards articulated by the Meiselman court. That is, they may never establish
the existence of an understanding, concurred in by the other shareholders. 184
Moreover, a minority shareholder who contributes capital to a corporation
and cannot establish that management participation or pecuniary benefit, for
example, were subjects of an understanding, would not appear eligible for re-
lief under sections 55-125(a)(4) and 55-125.1.185
Even when no understanding can be established, it is unreasonable to
deny the frozen-out minority shareholder the means to withdraw his invest-
ment, while the majority enjoys the profitability of the business through sala-
ries. The mere commitment of capital would seem to generate a reasonable
expectation of one's participation in profits or the right to withdraw one's in-
vestment if a return is withheld. Some may argue that the frozen-out minor-
ity, unable to establish his alleged expectations, should exercise his statutory
right to compel dividends. 86 The majority, however, may effectively frustrate
this right by forcing the minority to litigate annually.'8 7 Faced with an "incor-
rigible" majority, dissolution and alternative remedies, such as the buyout,
should be available to such a minority shareholder.188 The Meiselman reason-
able expectations test should be expanded to protect the minority who has
been frozen-out yet who cannot establish his expectations of participation or
pecuniary benefit as subjects of an understanding. An appropriate comple-
ment to the reasonable expectations defined and protected under Meiselman is
the reasonable expectation that the majority will fulfill its fiduciary duty to the
minority.
The doctrine of majority rule enables majority shareholders to control
183. To define more clearly statutory relief available to the minority shareholder, the North
Carolina legislature might consider the incorporation of a reasonable-expectations standard into
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982). See Davidian, supra note 37, at 62 (suggesting the legisla-
tive adoption of the reasonable expectations test in New York).
184. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
185. The Me/selman court does hint that some factors, absent an understanding, might play a
role in the reasonable expectations test. See Me/selman, 309 N.C. at 302, 307 S.E.2d at 565 (sug-
gesting that Michael's "rights or interests" might be determined in part from his ownership of
stock).
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50 (1982).
187. See supra note 56.
188. See Comment, supra note 71, at 139-40 ("The courts may look for a 'pattern of conduct
by the dominant shareholders and a disposition on their part to continue the pattern' that is viola-
tive of the rights and interests of the minority. When the future holds 'no hopes of abatement,' or
where the majority is 'incorrigible,' dissolution may be in order.") (quoting Gidwitz v. Lanzit
Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 208, 220, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (1960)).
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corporate affairs. Majority shareholders should not be permitted, however, to
exercise that power arbitrarily or without regard to minority interests.18 9 That
the majority owes a fiduciary duty to the minority is now widely recog-
nized.' 90 The applicability of such a fiduciary standard in the context of a
freeze-out has been recognized by Professor O'Neal:
Any of the schemes to [freeze-]out minority shareholders raise basic
questions as to the nature and extent of the duties owed by control-
ling shareholders, directors, and officers. . . to minority sharehold-
ers. . .. [The] view that the controlling shareholders and corporate
managers do not owe duties to minority shareholders is outmoded, at
least as applied to [freeze-louts and other attempts to deprive minor-
ity shareholders of their proportionate rights without a just
equivalent. Where several owners carry on an enterprise together,
their relationship should be considered a fiduciary one.' 9 1
The North Carolina Supreme Court has applied a fiduciary standard to
majority shareholders of a close corporation in Gaines v. Long Manufacturing
Co. 192 In Gaines a minority shareholder sought an injunction to prevent the
proposed issuance of additional stock, which would have diluted his interest in
the corporation. 193 The court recognized that the majority owes a fiduciary
duty to the minority. 194 Such a relationship imposes on the majority
the duty to exercise good faith, care, and diligence to make the prop-
erty of the corporation produce the largest possible amount, to pro-
tect the interests of the holders of the minority of the stock, and to
secure and pay over to them their just proportion of the income and
of the proceeds of the corporate property. 195
Actions of the majority "'causing a deprivation or sacrifice of [the minority's]
pecuniary interests or holdings'" constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.1 9 6
Like the reasonable expectations test, this fiduciary duty operates to pro-
tect minority interests by limiting the exercise of majority control. To effectu-
ate the Meiselman court's goal of protecting the frozen-out minority who has
189. See F. O'NE.L, supra note 46, § 7.13.
190. See, eg., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) ("The majority has the
right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relationship toward the minority, as
much as the corporation itself or its officers and directors."); Mires v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 14 Ariz.
App. 190, 481 P.2d 876 (1971); Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592, (1969); Bennett v. Brevil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. Ct. 1953);
Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d 1086 (1977); Seaboard Indus. v. Monaco, 442 Pa. 256,
276 A.2d 305 (1971). See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 46, § 7.13; Note, Strict Fiduciary Duty in
Close Corporations: A Concept in Search of Adoption, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 1 (1982).
191. F. O'NEAL, supra note 46, § 7.13 (footnote omitted).
192. 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d 350 (1951). A fiduciary standard also was applied in the com-
panion case of Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 331, 68 S.E.2d 355 (1951). There the minority
alleged that the majority "are willfully and deliberately failing to pay dividends, and are operating
[the] business for their own gain and advantage for the purpose of rendering the stock of the
plaintiff valueless and with the deliberate intent of 'freezing-out' plaintiff from his ownership in
[the] corporation." Id at 339, 67 S.E.2d at 361.
193. Gaines, 234 N.C. at 344, 67 S.E.2d at 353.
194. Id at 345, 67 S.E.2d at 354.
195. Id at 344, 67 S.E.2d at 353.
196. Id at 345, 67 S.E.2d at 354 (quoting White v. Kincaid, 149 N.C. 415, 63 S.E. 109 (1908)).
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failed to protect himself, it would be appropriate, therefore, to complement the
reasonable expectations test with the fiduciary duty. That is, the minority's
reasonable expectations should include a fiduciary duty owed the minority by
the majority. Under Gaines this standard includes a duty to provide a return
to the minority from profits. Consequently, a freeze-out would constitute a
breach, to the extent pecuniary benefit is denied. Furthermore, relief under
sections 55-125(a)(4) and 55-125.1 would be available to the frozen-out minority
who is unable to establish an understanding.
As noted, enhanced minority shareholder relief carries with it the poten-
tial for minority shareholder abuse of the dissolution suit 1 97 and damage to
corporate viability.' 98 Ideally, the statutory scheme of minority relief and its
judicial interpretation will strike a balance between minority relief and the
potential hazards that accompany relief. Possibly the most unpalatable hazard
is the minority shareholder who might use the dissolution suit against an inno-
cent majority to manipulate corporate decisionmaking. 99 A statute that al-
lows the majority to terminate a dissolution action upon its agreement to buy
out the minority interest2°° has been recognized as a deterrent to such
abuse.201 Faced with a certain buy-out, the minority may forego litigation
based on manipulation of the corporation rather than legitimate expectations
of participation.202 Such a statute also enables the majority to terminate disso-
lution litigation that might damage the corporation.203 While North Carolina
has a statutory buy-out remedy, it is granted at the court's discretion. 2°4 A
majority initiated buy-out statute should accompany this provision.
The reasonable expectations test in Meiselman certainly expands the body
of North Carolina law regarding minority shareholder relief under sections
55-125(a)(4) and 55-125.1. Unfortunately, this test fails to protect some minor-
197. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1977):
"(a) . . . in any suit for involuntary dissolution . . . the corporation or . . . the
holders of 50 percent or more of the voting power of the corporation. . . may avoid the
dissolution of the corporation ... by purchasing for cash the shares owned by the plain-
tiffs or by shareholder so initiating the proceeding. . . at their fair value. The fair value
shall be determined on the basis of the liquidation value but taking into account the
possibility, if any, of the sale of the entire business as a going concern in a liquidation,"
Id
Several states have adopted similar statutes. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-384
(West Supp. 1981); MD. CoRPs. & ASSN'S CODE ANN. § 4-603 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.
751 (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 1118(a)-(b) (Consol. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (1982).
Unlike the California statute some states provide for an alternative to lump sum cash pay-
ment by the majority. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118(a) (Consol. 1979) (providing for a
buyout of shares "at their fair value and upon such terms and conditions as may be approved by
the court" (emphasis added)).
201. See Stumpf v. C. E. Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 236, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671,
674 (1975). See also Davidian, supra note 37, at 48.
202. See Davidian, supra note 37, at 47.
203. Id
204. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1(a)(4) (1982).
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ity shareholders who may in fact be suffering from a freeze-out by the majority
shareholders. Consequently, the reasonable expectations test should be com-
plemented with the standard that the majority owes a fiduciary duty to the
minority. Additionally, the legislature should balance enhanced minority re-
lief with a statutory provision permitting.the majority shareholders to termi-
nate litigation initiated under section 55-125(a)(4) when they agree to buy out
the minority interest.
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